Reviewed by Chris Poullaos University of New South Wales
Professor Gaffikin is worried about the intellectual status of the accounting discipline. He fears that it lacks a sound theoretical base and that its practitioners have paid insufficient attention to fundamental issues, especially methodological ones. He agrees with Sterling that accountants have recycled rather than resolved issues and fears that “accounting, as a separate intellectual discipline, is in danger of losing its identity” [p. 5]. Having been persuaded by Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others that methodological issues are to be addressed philosophically and historically, through the study of the work of actual theorists, Gaffikin focuses on the work of R. J. Chambers, whose concerns parallel and predate his own. He “sets out to determine the basis of sound methodology espoused in the philosophical, economic and accounting literatures, and [his study] is especially [directed to Chambers’ work]. Conclusions [concerning what Chambers saw as the basis of sound methodology and how this matches current opinions in the general methodological debate] . .. are provided” [p. 4, original emphasis]. Chambers is of interest as a seminal figure, “who has attempted to add substance to accounting theory” [p. 5].
Nevertheless, Chambers has failed (so far) to persuade academics or practitioners to accept his solution to the lack of rigor in the development of accounting theories and practices. Gaffikin is interested in this response and seeks, through an historicallybased methodological critique of Chambers’ work, to explore whether its nonacceptance can be explained on methodological grounds.
Like Chambers, Gaffikin takes seriously the view that the epistemological claims of accounting theoreticians can (should?) be assessed by reference to philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular. Accordingly, chapter 2 provides a historical review of twentiethcentury philosophy of science. It traces the rise and fall of The Received View (the incorporation of logical positivism and logical empiricism into the hypotheticodeductive model of scientific explanation). The work of “postempiricist” philosophers (Kuhn, Lakatos, etc.) is also reviewed. Gaffikin uses it to illuminate the difficulties of the Received View and of reconstructing a response to “Cartesian anxiety”. That is: where can we find “an Archimedean point upon which we can ground our knowledge” [Bernstein, 1983, cited on p. 32]. Gaffikin (ostensibly quite deliberately) leaves the reader wondering whether such a project is still possible.
In chapter 3, Gaffikin selectively reviews the disparate methodological themes incorporated into economics “in the last two centuries”. He traces the impact (and nonimpact) of philosophy on economics and identifies methodological positions which have influenced Chambers and the accounting literature generally. For Gaffikin, economics is a discipline in crisis. Positive economics in particular has not come to grips with philosophical critique of the Received View, while both accounting and economics are at risk because of the crisis in philosophy. “If there is no scientific method — or no one scientific method — what does it mean for disciplines such as economics and accounting?” [p. 67, original emphasis].
Chapter 4 describes “the development of Chambers’s main theses … [in particular “his notions of methodology”] … by describing his environment and then determining how it became reflected in his writing” [pp. 69, 115]. It identifies personal, professional and intellectual influences on Chambers’ career and traces the gradual emergence of Chambers’ theory of continuously contemporary accounting over a period of twenty years. Gaffikin makes the point that Chambers consciously sought to clarify and rigorously pursue a methodological position, utilizing the economics and the philosophy of science available to him. As to the latter, Chambers’ turned to (what was later called) the Received View.
In chapter 5, Gaffikin present a critique of Chambers’ meth odology, based partly upon his earlier review of the philosophy of science. Gaffikin briefly acknowledges that Chambers’ work surfers from the limitations of the Received View [p. 144]. However, this point is not pursued (possibly to avoid repetition). He focuses instead on the deficiencies of philosophical theories as bases for evaluating Chambers’ work [see pp. 132144]. One result is that is the reader is left (deliberately?) in doubt as to whether continuously contemporary accounting has been [or should have been, or could have been] rejected on ‘sound’ methodological grounds. Chapter 5 also identifies the influence of particular economists on Chambers [pp. 144150]. However, Gaffikin’s critical remarks are mostly reserved for the proponents of positive accounting theory who have taken on board, more or less, the same methodological limitations as the proponents of positive economics [pp. 152159]. Nevertheless, Gaffikin makes the point that Chambers shares a great deal of common methodological ground with the positive accountants. Thus, readers might be prompted to reflect upon the present dominance of ‘positivist’ methodologies in accounting — if they can be persuaded to take an interest in ‘methodology’ rather than ‘method’. (In this context, it is ironic that the Accounting Review’s reviewer has claimed that Gaffikin’s book “will not appeal to a large number of readers of this journal” [Anthony, 1991, p. 660]).
In chapter 6, the stakes are raised still higher. By now the crises in the philosophy of science and economics (and thus in accounting) are taken for granted. Gaffikin is already persuaded of the demise of the possibility of discovering “the quintessence” of a “scientific method” which might rescue the accounting discipline. He is an opponent of methodological monism and considers that development of “objective, valuefree theories” is “merely an empty dream” [p. 163]. He now pays more attention to the argument that the epistemological and ontological bases, and possibly the aims of the “social sciences” are quite different from those of the “natural sciences”. Fleeting references are made to critical theory, hermeneutics, phenomemology, ethnomethodolgy and the emerging ‘radical’ accounting literature. As well as generating some further criticisms of Chambers’ work [see pp, 187200], Gaffikin highlights the possibility of ‘postCartesian anxiety’ in accounting and other disciplines. How are we to avoid the pitfalls of relativism and pluralism — or just plain sloppiness — in the absence of definitive standards of intellectual achievement? Is this our worst nightmare or our best opportunity?
Gaffikin succeeds in raising issues relevant to contemporary accounting academicians by means of an historical analysis of the work of one theorist. He also succeeds in identifying problems that a neoChamberian theory of accounting will need to overcome; and he points towards some possible solutions. Some reservations are in order. Gaffikin denies that rejection of continuously contemporary accounting can be explained on methodological grounds. He claims that it has been rejected for “political, historical, institutional, psychological and sociological” reasons [p. 200]. These reasons are not spelled out. While pursuit of those reasons may reasonably be regarded as a separate project, Gaffikin at times gives the impression that he intends to account more fully for the nonacceptance of CoCoA (e.g., see the synopsis). Second, Gaffikin claims to have “demonstrated that Chambers has presented the most ambitious revision of accounting” [p. 200]. While Chambers may indeed have done so, Gaffikin has not analyzed the work of other writers (e.g., Sterling) in sufficient depth to clinch his point. Third, some readers will probably quibble about the choice of “alternative” theories highlighted in the final chapter. Why, for example, is there not more mention of Foucault’s critique of the “will to knowledge” and of the darker side of the “human sciences”? On a more prosaic level: the book would have benefited from another round of proofreading and an index would have been useful.
Notwithstanding these reservations, this book is recommended to those interested in the work of R. J. Chambers, and is of more general interest as an attempt to grapple with the philosophy of science, economics and “alternative” theories so as to illuminate both the past and present state of discipline of accounting.
REFERENCE
Anthony, J. P., Review of M. J. R. Gaffikin, Accounting Methodology and the Work of R. J. Chambers, Accounting Review (1991): pp. 659660.
