Dean Neu UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

“DISCOVERING” INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: ACCOUNTING AND THE MACHINERY OF EMPIRE

Abstract: This study examines the historical usage of accounting as a technology of government within the domain of governmentindigenous peoples relations in Canada. Our thesis is that accounting was salient within the chain of circumstances that influenced the discovery/identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population. By the 1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central place in the military machinery of empire. When the costcutting and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the early 1800s encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used in the attempt to interrogate military expenditures. Partially as a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be identified as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats. However, it was at the level of the colonial administration in the Upper and Lower Canadas that the competing demands of “government” encouraged indigenous peoples to be viewed as a potential site for government. And it was once this “discovery” was made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the attempt to turn indigenous peoples into a governable population. This study contributes to our understanding of accounting by documenting the ways in which techniques such as accounting were central to the military machinery of empire and British imperialism. The study also contributes to our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape currentday usages of accounting as a technology of government within the domain of governmentFirst Nations relations.

Acknowledgments: This manuscript benefited from the comments of colleagues at the University of Calgary and participants at the University of Alberta/Calgary critical accounting gathering. The funding provided by the Canadian Academic Accounting Association and the research assistance of Rita Lavoie, Melissa Luhtanen, and Richard Therrien are gratefully acknowledged.

The sun never sets on the British Empire [source unknown].

INTRODUCTION

The “discoveries” of America by Columbus in 1492, the province of Newfoundland by Cabot in 1497, and the province of Quebec by Cartier in 1534 [Wright, 1993, p. 122] marked the beginning of 250 years of struggle between the imperial powers of France and Britain for control of the territory we now call Canada and its inhabitants. Both France and Britain courted the indigenous peoples as important military allies in the periodic skirmishes that occurred. When the British Empire ultimately prevailed over France in 1760, it subsequently issued a Royal Proclamation in 1763 recognizing the rights of aboriginal peoples to unceded lands and stating that the negotiations between Britain and aboriginal peoples would be on a nationtonation basis [Royal Proclamation, 1763]. In the subsequent war of independence with the United States, aboriginal peoples were encouraged to side with Britain in return for parcels of land in Upper Canada [Report on the Affairs of Indians in Canada, 1847, S3, p. 5.1].1

In the 250 years since this Royal Proclamation, relations between the remnants of the British Empire and First Nations peoples have certainly changed. Nationtonation relations have been replaced by paternal relations in which the government of Canada has attempted , through coercive tutelage [Dyck, 1997], to “govern” [Foucault, 1991] the affairs of First Nations peoples. The recent Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples [1996], for example, documented the ways in which the Canadian government has attempted to assimilate and otherwise manage the affairs of indigenous peoples [see particularly Volume 1, Chapters 810]. Through the bureaucratic mechanisms of the Department of Indian Affairs and the supporting “Indian Act,” the state has attempted to exercise action at a distance over First Nations peoples. Within these attempts at governance, accounting techniques such as funding and taxation relations have been used to encourage/discourage certain behaviors [see also Reform Party, 1997].

In certain ways these shifts in relations parallel more general shifts in the “art of government.” Miller and Rose [1990, p. 2] commented that the modern state has come to rely on technologies of government to align economic, political, and social objectives. Through “apparently humble and mundane mechanisms” such as “techniques of notation, computation and calculation,” along with professional expertises [Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 8], government is exercised in the attempt to enable action at a distance — to incite, induce, and seduce populations to behave in certain ways [Foucault, 1984, p. 171]. Since the 19th century, these techniques of rule have supplemented and mostly supplanted more direct forms of sovereign power in core countries [Foucault, 1991, p. 102]. However, as Fanon [1963] stated, within the colonial context force continues to form the backdrop for more subtle forms of governance.

If, as we suggest, Canada’s indigenous population has come to be viewed by the state as a population to be “governed,” how did the slippage from a nationtonation relationship to a paternal relationship occur and how did First Nations peoples come to be targeted as a site for government? Furthermore, when were accounting techniques introduced as a technology of government? In answering these questions, this study suggests that the following circumstances contributed to the “discovery” of indigenous peoples as a population to be governed. By the 1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central place in the military machinery of empire. When the costcutting and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the early 1800s encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used in the attempt to interrogate military expenditures. Partially as a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be identified as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats. However, it was at the level of the colonial administration in the Upper and Lower Canadas that the competing demands of “government” encouraged indigenous peoples to be viewed as a potential site for government.2 It was once this “discovery” was made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the attempt to turn indigenous peoples into a governable population.

This study contributes to our understanding of accounting in two ways. First, the study documents the ways in which techniques such as accounting were central to the military machinery of empire. Authors such as Headrick [1981] have argued that the “hardware of imperialism”— technical innovations such as the Gatling gun, the steamboat, quinine, etc. — contributed to the success of European imperialism. More recently it has been recognized that the “software of imperialism”

— professional expertises such as geography, accounting, etc.
— also played a role in imperialism [Said, 1993; Bell et al.,

1995; Neu, 1997]. The current study contributes to this line of inquiry by documenting the intertwining of accounting within the military machinery of empire.

Second, the study locates the moment and manner in which accounting techniques first came to be focused on Canada’s indigenous population. Within the domain of presentday, governmentFirst Nations relations, government policy appears to be directed at encouraging action at a distance. But how did accounting techniques come to penetrate this domain? The analysis provided seeks to “identify the accidents, the minute deviations. . . . that gave birth to those things that continue to exist” [Foucault, 1984, p. 81]. This study contributes to our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape currentday usages of accounting as a technology of government. In doing so, the study illustrates the persistence of accounting as a technology of government within the domain of governmentFirst Nations relations.

GOVERNING THE EMPIRE

Imperialism means thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that is distant, that is lived on and owned by others [Said, 1993, p. 5].

By all accounts, the 19th century was the age of the British Empire [cf Hobson, 1902; Headrick, 1981; Davis and Huttenback, 1986]. The amount of territory controlled by Britain and the population under its tutelage increased sevenfold and twentyfold respectively:

The British Empire alone, already formidable in 1800 with a land area of 1.5 million square miles and a population of twenty million, increased its land area sevenfold and its population twentyfold in the following hundred years [Headrick, 1981, p. 3].

Although other European imperial powers were also expanding during this time period, between 1800 and 1914 the amount of the world’s land surface controlled by Europeans increased from 35 percent to 84 percent [Headrick, 1981, p. 3]. Britain was perhaps the most successful [Barclay, 1976, p. 1].

In attempting to explain the success of imperialism, Headrick [1981, p. 9] suggested that imperialism occurred when both adequate motives and means were present for imperial expansion. Economic motives were assumed to be adequate motives for the expansion of the British Empire [Hobson, 1902, p. 59]; business interests at least benefitted from imperial expansion even if the British taxpayer ended up absorbing the costs of empire [Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 317]. Adequate means referred to the existence of technologies that supported imperial expansion and control [Headrick, 1981, 1988].

Headrick [1981] argued that the adoption of new technologies for military purposes provided the means for imperial expansion. For example, the development of steam gunboats aided in the colonization of India [pp. 1742]; the identification of quinine as a protection against malaria along with steam gunboats assisted in the colonization of Africa [p. 73]; and the development of breechloading and repeatfiring guns throughout the colonies allowed for the subjugation of indigenous peoples [p. 115]. Additionally, technologies such as steamships, railways, and communication cables furthered both military and economic purposes. These technologies have been referred to as the “hardware of imperialism” [Bell et al., 1995].

Parallelling the development of such hardware was the development of “softer” expertises and disciplines, what Bell et al. [1995, p. 2] referred to as the software of imperialism. Disciplinary knowledges such as geography, medicine, and accounting helped imperial powers come to “know” the territories and inhabitants under their control [Said, 1979, p. 84; Bell et al., 1995, p. 4]. These techniques sorted, sifted, and classified, allowing knowledges of “distant places…to be mobilized [and] brought home to centres of calculation in the form of maps, drawings, readings” [Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 9].
Miller and Rose [1990, p. 8] used the phrase “technologies of government” to denote the roles played by softer and indirect techniques such as accounting in the act of governing at “home and abroad:

We use the term technologies to suggest a particular approach to the analysis of the activity of ruling, one which pays great attention to the actual mechanisms through which authorities of various sorts have sought to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider desirable.

Miller and Rose [1990, p. 16] specifically mentioned techniques of accounting (i.e.; techniques of notation, computation, and calculation) and discussed the implementation of discounted cash flow analysis in Britain. Although the focus of Miller and Rose’s [1990, p. 9] analysis was on the usage of technologies of government within imperial centers, they acknowledged the roles played by these technologies in the colonies. Likewise, Said [1979, p. 40] discussed the role of softer technologies within the processes of colonization, and Neu [1997] examined how accounting techniques in colonial Canada were used to control and contain indigenous peoples. These studies hinted at the ways in which technologies of government were intertwined with the hardware of imperialism. The current study builds on these insights in examining the intertwining of accounting with the military apparatuses of empire.

MILITARY MACHINERY AND ACCOUNTING CALCULATION

Following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s, economic retrenchment became the principal objective of British government in the attempt to reduce the national debt [Spiers, 1980, p. 74]. Not surprisingly, the military became a primary target for such reduction given that military expenditures were the main items of public expenditure. “Expenditure on the army and ordnance fell from 43,256,260£ in 1815 to 10,699,865£ in 1820; thereafter it slipped below 10£ million, plummeting to just under 8£ million in 1836” [Spiers, 1980, p. 74]. Coinciding with this crisis of expenditure was an increase in antimilitary sentiment at home and the emergence of a strong reform sentiment [Sweetman, 1984, pp. 15,17]. Together these sentiments encouraged a “deluge of official action,” including bills and the formation of select committees to examine various aspects of public policy and government administration.
Colonial military operations were neither spared from these reform and costsaving sentiments nor from official government actions. On February 18, 1834, the British House of Commons ordered “that a select Committee be appointed to

We treat the notion of governmentality and technologies of government as a “field of investigation” (Miller and Rose, 1995) and theorize these techniques within the broader notion(s) of imperialism/colonialism.

Neu: Discovering Indigenous Peoples 59
inquire into the Military Establishment and Expenditure in the Colonies and Dependencies of The Crown” [Report, 1834, Vol. 1, p. 1]. The Committee gathered evidence, interviewed witnesses, and presented the first volume of its report to the House of Commons in August 1834. The second volume was completed and presented to the House of Commons in 1835. In these reports, the Committee examined military establishments and expenditures in the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, the Western Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Island of Ceylon [in Vol. 1] and New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, and the North American Provinces [in Vol. 2]. The published report of the Select Committee contains the Select Committee’s analysis and recommendations along with minutes of evidence from witnesses and supplementary appendices.

The Report is an exceptional document produced at a specific juncture in time, partially in response to the demands for administrative reform and increased economy in the military. More specifically, the Report illustrates how, at least at this moment in time, the military machinery of empire relied on techniques such as accounting. In his examination of the administration of the British military during this time period, Sweetman [1984, p. 3] made a similar point when he commented that the “development of improved techniques of accounting . . . created the impetus for efficiency which reflected throughout the [military] administrative system.

The mandate of the Select Committee and the Reports themselves illustrate this intertwining of the hardware and software of empire. The mandate of the Select Committee was to inquire into both the adequacy of military establishments and the cost of these establishments. Throughout the minutes of evidence, witnesses were repeatedly asked to juxtapose and balance these two goals. And in the final Report, the first two recommendations explicitly dealt with the adequacy of force and the cost of maintaining this force:

Resolved, That it is not the Intention of this Committee … to relieve the Executive Government from the Duty which constitutionally belongs to it, of providing . . . A

4 In subsequent discussions we refer to the published output of the Select Committee as “The Report,” which consists of the Select Committee’s analysis and recommendations, along with the minutes of evidence and supplementary appendices.

force sufficient for the Security of His Majesty’s Possessions abroad [Report, Vol. 1., p. iii, emphases added].
and:

Resolved, That the Committee are of the Opinion, That the strictest Economy should be observed in every branch of Military Expenditure of the Colonies; and that any surplus Revenue that may remain after defraying their Civil Expenses. . . be applied to the payment of their Military Charges [Report, Vol. 1, p. iii, emphases added].

Thus, the mandate of the Select Committee and the final Report itself set up as mutual goals the maintenance of effective and efficient military force in the colonies [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 26, 44].

It was these notions of efficiency and economy so prevalent in reformist discourses at this time [cf. Sweetman, 1984, p. 13] which provided the rhetorical space for accounting techniques. In attempting to assess the economy of military operations in distant places, the Committee turned not only to eyewitnesses but to accounting techniques and records. Consistent with the comments of Miller and Rose [1990, p. 8], [ac]counting records provided the Select Committee with a shortform representation of distant events. By providing this information to decision makers in the imperial center, accounting helped to render these distant locales “governable.

Throughout the Report is the recognition that accounting is a “useful” technology with regards to governing military operations. The Report contains an extended discussion of the accounting records for individual detachments and whether these records provide appropriate information [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 6364, 83]. In keeping with the emphasis on economy, questions posed by the lawyer for the Select Committee to a bureaucrat from the military asked whether accounting methods promoted economy:

Q. If those two are able to keep the accounts in the whole of Newfoundland for 276 rank and file, how is it that so large a staff is kept in those parts of Canada where detachments from only 10 to 50 men exist?

A. … The same description of accounts are necessary for a detachment of 50 men as are necessary for a regiment of 800, provided the regiment of

800 is at one post; but if the regiment is scattered over different parts of the country, then that would impose additional labour upon the commissariat, because each detachment would require the same description of accounts to be rendered in duplicate, and the same description of vouchers [Report, Vol. 2, p. 63].
The notion of economy also motivated discussions regarding the prevention of fraud [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 57, 73] and discussions regarding how often the accounts of different detachments/regiments/commissariats were audited and by whom [p. 65]. From these examples, it appears that accounting techniques were viewed as an integral tool in the government of military operations.

The Report itself not only discussed accounting techniques but used accounting numbers. [Ac]counting data were interspersed throughout the Report, usually with the effect of making visible certain aspects of military operations. For example, included in the appendices were tables listing the cost to Britain of military operations in different colonies.

AN ACCOUNT of the AMOUNT paid by Great Britain for the MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Source: Appendix to Report from Select Committee on Military Expenditure [1835]
Other tables enumerated the number and distribution of effective forces, including a breakdown of officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers in Canada [Report, Vol. 2, p. 96], whereas yet other tables summarized the “pay, allowances, emoluments, advantages and salaries” accruing to different military personnel in different locations [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 9095].

This cost information was then referred to in the questioning of witnesses regarding the appropriate military force at a particular location.
In these ways, accounting information represented to the Select Committee the state of affairs in the colonies and thereby provided a starting point for examining issues of military economy. This information also created the illusion that it was possible to compare the military efficiency of disparate locales. For example, a recurrent theme in the questioning of military officials by the Select Committee was the differential cost of military personnel in Nova Scotia visàvis the rest of Canada:

It appears by the Returns that the number of troops in Nova Scotia and in Canada are nearly equal; that there is not a difference of above 200 between the amount of troops in Canada and Nova Scotia: be kind enough to explain to the Committee why there is such a difference between the amount of the expense of the commissariat at Canada and Nova Scotia; and state why it should be three times the amount at the one place as it is at the other, for nearly the same number of troops [Report, Vol. 2, p. 55]?

Although the locales under consideration were quite different, the Committee kept returning to the issue of cost differences, asking the witnesses to explain why two jurisdictions in the same general geographic area [i.e., North America] had such different costs [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 53, 55, 72]. This reliance on accounting data to compare locations is not surprising since, as Miller and Rose [1990, p. 7] commented, programs of government depend on apparently “stable, mobile, combinable and comparable” data because such data render the domain under consideration “susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention.”
Accounting information not only provided a starting point for comparing the military efficiency of different locales as represented in numbers but also for interrogating the military judgments of the expert witnesses. For example, cost data pertaining to the governor of Newfoundland’s ship provided the starting point for the following line of questioning directed at the former governor of Newfoundland:

Is there not a vessel or yacht for the governor’s use at Newfoundland? Yes, there is … What is the amount of expense? The contract for the vessel is 2,300£ a year [pp. 3233] … do you consider it absolutely necessary that a yacht should be kept up, or so large a vessel as at present? I think that it is quite necessary that the vessel should be kept up. The size at present is not more than adequate for the purpose for which she is wanted. She is not wanted exclusively for the governor’s use; she is required when necessary to send detachments of troops to different parts of the islands, and she should be able to carry them…and she has been sent to cruize when complaints have been made of the conduct of the French with respect to the fishery and to prevent smuggling and other duties [p. 40].

In this example, accounting data made visible certain aspects of military operations in the Canadian colony. Select Committee members focused their questions on these aspects, asking the military witnesses to justify in military terms the appropriateness of these expenditures.

In another instance, accounting data were used to frame the decision as to whether “regular forces” or the militia should be used to defend Canada. These kinds of questions were directed toward a lieutenant colonel stationed in Nova Scotia:

Q. Is the militia force a popular force in Nova Scotia?
A. I should say it is certainly

Q. How are the officers and men paid when embodied?
A. They are paid by a vote of the House of Assembly…

Q. Is not the pay very inferior to that which they can obtain by labour or by any work as artisans or labourers?
A. The pay is very inferior . . .

Q. Then taking that into consideration, and taking into consideration the difficulty of finding employment for emigrants…do you think there would be any doubt of finding a sufficient number of men for the militia at as low a rate of pay as British soldiers?
A. Emigrants without money would enlist. . .

Q. Supposing the experiment were tried … do you, in a military point of view see any objection to employing a proportion of that force, and releasing an equivalent proportion of the regular force of the country?
A. If it were possible to have the militia as perfectly trained as our militia were during the late war, I should see no objection to a certain portion, but I doubt that being practicable [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 2829].

The above line of questioning illustrates the ways in which the Select Committee forced its military witnesses to justify their military judgments in terms of cost efficiency. The issue of cost as constructed through accounting reports continually framed and set the parameters for military judgments.
As hinted in the above examples, accounting techniques and data provided a “map” of distant military operations, making visible the military configurations of these distant locales. The maps formed by apparently stable, combinable, and comparable accounting data [Miller and Rose, 1990, pp. 7, 9] brought home to the “centers of calculation” information about colonial military arrangements, thereby allowing “local” knowledges to be mobilized by imperial powers [Said, 1979, p. 44]. Accounting numbers helped operationalize the discourse of economy [cf. Power, 1992, p. 478; Neu and Taylor, 1996, p. 451] and thereby created a discursive framework in which military decisions were viewed and ultimately had to be justified. This same data also provided the Select Committee with a starting basis for questioning and interrogating the opinions and judgments of military witnesses. By continually juxtaposing the “truths” as made visible by accounting numbers with the “truths” enunciated by military personnel, the Select Committee sought to understand the state of military operations in these distant colonies.

The foregoing analysis illustrates the ways in which the military machinery of empire at this juncture relied on accounting techniques. Accounting techniques had penetrated the domain of military operations and appeared to function not only as the guidance system for the empire’s military machinery but also as a useful technology for interrogating the military costs during this period of economic retrenchment. In the next sections, we analyze how indigenous peoples came to be viewed as a site for cost cutting and, subsequently, as a population to be governed.

A SITE FOR COST CUTTING

Relations between Canada’s indigenous peoples and the British military date back to at least the 1600s. In 1670, Charles

II issued a code of instructions to the governors of the Canadian colonies instructing the military to “at no time give any just provocation to any of the said Indians that are at peace with us” [RAIC, 1844, p. a.3]. Throughout the subsequent colonial skirmishes, the British military sought to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies in their battles with the French and in the subsequent War of Independence. Following the capitulation of the French in North America in 1760, Britain formally recognized the rights of indigenous peoples in the Royal Proclamation of 1763:

And whereas it is just and reasonable and essential to our interest and the security of our Colonies, that the several natives or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such part of our dominions and territories, as not having been ceded to us, are reserved to them, or any of them as their hunting grounds.

Not only did the Proclamation recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to unceded land, it stated that negotiations between Britain and indigenous peoples would be on a nationtonation basis [Milloy, 1983].

Even after the defeat of France, the British military continued to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies. The annual distribution of “presents” to indigenous peoples was the primary method of maintaining this military support:

From the earliest period of the connexion between the Indians and the British Government it has been customary to distribute annually certain presents, consisting chiefly of clothing and ammunition. . . . The objective at that period was doubtless in the first instance to conciliate the Indians, to ensure their services, and to supply their wants as warriors in the field; and afterwards, in times of peace, to secure their allegiance towards the British Crown, and their good will and peaceful behaviour towards the white settlers [RAIC, 1844, p. 6].

The military connection between indigenous peoples and the British empire was formally recognized in 1816 with the transfer of jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the Commander of the Forces. The Indian Department, as it came to be called, was responsible for the yearly distribution of presents and other matters pertaining to relations between the military and indigenous peoples:

The system of dealing with them was essentially military. For a long time they were under the head of the military department, and were considered and treated as military allies or stipendiaries [RAIC, 1844, p. 6]

Therefore, relations between the military and indigenous peoples were not immune to the costcutting sentiments of the times. The costcutting sentiments prevalent in Britain encouraged the continual whittling away of the budget for the military [Sweetman, 1984, p. 17] which, in turn, impacted upon military operations in the Canadian provinces. As early as 1822, the Colonial Secretary for the Canadian provinces “contemplated a reduction of the Indian Department, with a view to its ultimate abolition” [RAIC, 1844, p. 7]. In 1829, the Lords of Treasury and the Secretary of State issued an order that “the whole expense of the [Indian] Department should not exceed 20,000£.” In 1832, an accounting allocation change was recommended that the charges for the Indian Department be separated from other charges relating to colonial operations in Canada when being presented to Parliament for approval:

Previously to this period the charges for the presents, including those given on account of the annuities payable for lands surrendered, had been yearly granted by the British Parliament in a separate vote, while the salaries and pensions of the officers of the Indian Department had been paid from the military chest. This course being considered irregular, Lord Goderich proposed that for the future, the landpayments or annuities payable for land surrendered, which were confined to Upper Canada, should be charged on the Casual or Territorial Revenue of that Province, while the remaining charge, having been originally incurred with the view of securing the services of Indians in wars, for British, and not exclusively colonial interests, ought, according to His Lordship’s view, to be provided by the Imperial Parliament [RAIC, 1844, p. 8].

This shift in policy, which was implemented in 1834, had the effect of making visible the costs of maintaining current relations with indigenous peoples. These costcutting sentiments and accounting policy changes would reemerge in the 1835 Select Committee Report, contributing to the Report’s ultimate conclusion that the Indian Department should be abolished.

During the inquiry phase of the Select Committee, the Indian Department was subjected to the same scrutiny as other military operations. For example, accounting data regarding costs provided the starting point for asking a senior military official about the functions of the Indian Department visàvis the commissariat:

Q. It appears by the Returns that there are 40 men at Penetanguishene, and yet there are two deputy commissarygenerals at an expense of 273£, and 223£; there is an issuer and a labourer at 79£; making a total of 650£ for the mere commissariat: how can they be employed?

A. Penetanguishene is now the great depot in Upper Canada, from whence presents are issued to the Indians; but that will not justify, in my opinion, keeping permanently there so great a commissariat establishment [Report, Vol. 2, p. 52].

The answer to the above question suggested an overlap in the duties of the two departments. Following up on this suggestion, the Select Committee asked subsequent expert witnesses (e.g., deputy assistant commissarygeneral located in the Canadas) questions regarding the microdetails of present distribution and whether both departments were necessary:

Q: Have you yourself attended any of those [present] distributions? … At what place? . . . How many Indians attended? … At what months in the year? . . . What were the articles distributed? . . . Did you take all those things up with you, or is there any depot kept there? . . . On your arrival there, what measures are taken, and how is the distribution regulated? . . . Do any observations occur to you, as to a better and cheaper mode of distribution than that which is now used [pp. 7374]?
and:

Q: Can you give us any information as to the distribution of presents, and how far the duties now performed by the commissariat may be performed by the Indian Department, or the duties of the Indian Department performed by the commissariat?

A: I should think the commissariat would be quite competent to distribute the presents without any Indian Department, which is quite an expensive machine [p. 77].

As the above questions illustrate, once the Indian Department had been identified as a potential site for cost cutting, subsequent questions honed in on the actual duties performed by the department and the overlap with duties performed by the commissariat.

Given the parameters of the Select Committee’s mandate and the direction of the questions, the Report’s final conclusion regarding the Indian Department is not surprising:

Resolved: That the Committee are of the opinion from the Evidence taken, and to which they refer, that the Indian Department may be greatly reduced, if not entirely abolished, and they therefore call attention of the House to the same; and also to the expenses of articles annually distributed to the Indians, and whether any arrangement may not be made to dispense with such distribution in future, or to commute the presents for money [Report, Vol. 2, p. iii].
The evidence indicated that the military support provided by indigenous peoples was less needed in the 1830s than in earlier periods. This diminished need, coupled with the discourse of economy and the emphasis throughout the Committee’s process on cost cutting, made the final recommendation that the Indian Department be abolished quite predictable.

The preceding analysis proposes that concerns regarding the costs of maintaining Britain’s empire indirectly contributed to the identification of indigenous peoples in the Canadas as a site for cost cutting. Specifically, it was the interrogation of military costs in the colonies by the Select Committee that made visible the costs of the Indian Department. However, it is important to note that the identification of the Indian Department as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats is not synonymous with indigenous peoples coming to be identified as a site for governance, notwithstanding that it contributed. As the next section proposes, it was colonial administrators with responsibilities for the Canadas who, in attempting to balance the competing demands of “government,” encouraged this shift.

DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The recommendation of the Select Committee that the Indian Department be abolished was, perhaps, the most visible signal to colonial administrators that the “economics” of Canada’s indigenous peoples needed to be addressed. However, as we propose, it was the intersection of this funding issue, along with the other “problems of government” confronting colonial administrators, that encouraged the discovery/identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site of government.

At this juncture in time, the Canadas were undergoing significant changes. Following the American Revolution, “thousands of Loyalists poured into the Maritimes, sharply increasing pressures on the Aboriginal land and resource base” [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Likewise, the early 1800s witnessed the influx of immigrants from Britain, Ireland, and Scotland as the British government and charitable organizations provided generous aid to wouldbe settlers [Francis et al., 1988, p. 215]. As the Colonial Magazine [1840, p. 305] noted, in Upper Canada “during a period of thirteen years from 1823 to 1836, the increase of population was 200,000 alone, viz. from 150,000 to 350,000.” This influx of immigrants radically changed the relative numbers of settlers visàvis indigenous peoples. By 1812, the nonaboriginal population in Upper Canada outnumbered the aboriginal population by 10:1, a ratio that increased further in the subsequent decades [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. In turn, the activities of the settlers created problems of government for colonial administrators.
The increase in immigration led to increased pressure for land. In the Maritimes, “the landless new immigrants pursued agriculture and the export of timber, and although parcels of land had been set aside for the Indian peoples of the region, squatting and other incursions on the Aboriginal land base inevitably occurred” [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Changing economic activities, from the fur trade to agriculture, led to increasing incompatible pursuits of settlers and indigenous peoples, who were being marginalized from the development of agriculture [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 7]. As wheat farming and timber became the backbone of the Upper Canadian economy during the 18151860 period [Francis et al., 1988, p. 223], increased calls came for the discouragement of nomadic lifestyles and the containment of indigenous peoples on specific tracts of land.

As Canada’s population and economic activity were expanding rapidly during this period, Britain was becoming increasingly reluctant to bear the costs [cf. Cook and McNaught, 1963, p. 316]. Thus colonial officials were faced with the problem of reconciling three interrelated but potentially conflicting policy objectives. First was the need for greater fiscal responsibility. Second was the related issue of the need to control and contain indigenous peoples and to prevent their interference with settlement activities. Indigenous peoples were, by the terms of the Royal Proclamation, assuming rights of occupancy on land that colonial officials wished to sell to settlers [Royal Commission, 1996]. Abolishing the Indian Department in the name of cost cutting, however, would be contrary to the increased containment of indigenous peoples. The third objective was in response to reformist sentiments of the day, from a multitude of sources, that emphasized the need to “protect and civilize” indigenous peoples.

Protestant sects which were in the throes of evangelical movements stressed the need to Christianize indigenous peoples [Milloy, 1983, p. 56; Tobias, 1983, p. 40]:

Many of these sects established missions among the Indians, similar to those the Jesuits and other Catholic orders had been carrying on for generations. Such Missions were intended not only to teach the Indian a new religion, but also to encourage him to adopt European or American values [Tobias, 1983, p. 41].
In Britain, the Humanitarians argued for the protection and civilization of the Indian as did romantic writers on both sides of the Atlantic [Tobias, 1983, p. 41]. These sentiments tempered the economic solutions being contemplated by colonial administrators. As we argue below, it was by attempting to reconcile these diverse objectives that indigenous peoples came to be identified as a site for governance.

In responding to the specific recommendations of the Select Committee and these more general problems of government, Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated that the recommendation to eliminate the distribution of presents was inappropriate at the current time (1835):

I feel bound, after much consideration, to express my opinion, that the time has not yet arrived at which it would be possible, consistently with good faith, altogether to discontinue the annual presents to the Indians [RAIC, 1844, p. 9].

The rationale for this opinion was the belief that such a decision would be “impolitic” and that elimination of presents would hinder efforts to “civilize” indigenous peoples (i.e., would be contrary to other government objectives). However, the annual distribution of presents could be modified to help accomplish this goal with the aim of eventually “diminishing their amount, with a view to the ultimate abrogation of the existing custom” [RAIC, 1844, p. 9]. Toward this end, Glenelg directed the governors of the Canadian colonies to examine ways of modifying the type of presents distributed with the aim of encouraging both “civilization” and selfsufficiency:

Looking, however, to the moral and religious improvement of the Indians, and their instruction in the arts of civilized life, as the principal object to be kept in view in our intercourse with these tribes, I am anxious that your enquiries should be specifically directed to the practicability of effecting a commutation of the presents for some object of permanent benefit to the parties now receiving them.

Although Glenelg did not specifically mention the objective of controlling/containing indigenous peoples, the manner in which the distribution of presents was subsequently modified had this effect [Neu, 1997].

The solution to the dilemmas of government proposed by Glenelg articulated a changed view of indigenous peoples. By voicing the sentiment that the type of presents distributed could be manipulated to encourage the “civilization” of indigenous peoples, while at the same time satisfying the demands of settlers that indigenous peoples be contained, Lord Glenelg simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a population to be governed and proposed the appropriate technology for government funding relations. Although isolated attempts at governance via the manipulation of presents had occurred prior to this [cf. Neu, 1997, p. 22], Glenelg’s statement defined and foreshadowed British government policy toward indigenous peoples for the next 20 years.

It is important to note that the proposed solution indirectly addressed the three competing dilemmas of government. The specific costs associated with the Indian Department would be reduced over time and, if successful, indigenous peoples would both be contained and civilized. Furthermore, over the longer term, this strategy of containment would make it easier for colonial officials to buy and resell the land previously occupied by indigenous peoples since this land was no longer central to their subsistence. Thus, the proposed solution partially reconciled the competing demands facing officials at this juncture.
Throughout the chain of events leading to the discovery/ identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site for governance, accounting techniques were salient. Accounting techniques were implicated in the Select Committee process and in the ultimate recommendation that the Indian Department be abolished. Glenelg’s solution also proposed the manipulation of funding relations as a method of reconciling the competing policy objectives. As we will see in the next section, accounting techniques also assisted in the translation of this generalized plan into practice. Throughout this chain of events, accounting techniques and numbers appear to have functioned as an “ideological circle” [Smith, 1990] in that accounting calculations both framed the problem and suggested a potential solution that was consistent with the original framing [cf. Neu and Taylor, 1996, p. 452].

To state that accounting was salient to the process of discovering indigenous peoples as a potential site of governance is neither to suggest that discovery occurred at a single moment in time [cf. Foucault, 1984, p. 80] nor to assert a form of accountingcentrism whereby it is presumed that accounting is unilaterally responsible for this shift. The preceding analysis highlighted the idiosyncratic chain of events and circumstances which encouraged Glenelg’s articulation. Undoubtedly Glenelg’s construction of indigenous peoples as a potentially governable population echoed and harmonized [cf. Lehman and Tinker, 1987, p. 509] with other dominant constructions of the times [cf. Royal Commission, 1996] and thus should be viewed as, in part, an explicit (albeit “official”) statement of the zeitgeist of the times. However this being said, it seems safe to assert that it was during this general juncture in time that indigenous peoples came to be viewed as a potentially governable population. As the preceding analysis documents, accounting was intertwined with this chain of events and, thus, salient to the discovery.

IMPOSING GOVERNMENTALITY

While Lord Glenelg’s statements identified indigenous peoples as a potential site for governance, other government bureaucrats soon realized that to govern a population, one had to first “know” that population. Said [1979, p. 36] nicely captured this dialectic between knowledge and colonial government when he noted that:

Knowledge of subject races … is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.

Said’s comments point to the ways in which knowledge of indigenous peoples is a prerequisite for effective and efficient colonial government.
Apparently one of the first steps in obtaining the knowledge necessary for effective government of indigenous peoples was to request a census of indigenous peoples:

In the spring of 1837, the Lords of the Treasury, with the view to enable His Majesty’s Government to determine what ulterior arrangements it might be expedient to adopt for the purpose of encouraging the Indians to adopt agricultural pursuits, and acquire habits of settled industry . . . issued the following set of queries, which were transmitted to the Governor of either Province, and answered in considerable detail [RAIC, 1844, p. 11].

1st. The number of tribes and of Indians resident within the British Territory
2nd. The pursuits of each tribe, with the number of fixed locations occupied by the Indians
3rd. The situation of the locations of the settled parties or of hunting grounds occupied by the other Indians
4th. The extent of lands set apart at the different locations, for the use of the Indians, or of the hunting ranges
5th. The persons employed in the superintendence of the settled Indians, or of the other Tribes, with the designations and salaries, and a summary of the duties they have to perform
6th. The number and description of the Clergy or teachers attached to each tribe or party
7th. Whether the expenses of the tribe or party are defrayed by the Parliamentary grant or from the land payments, out of the Territorial Revenue of the Crown.

As the above questions indicate, this census sought to represent the population of indigenous peoples with an emphasis on how large the population was, where they resided, how they lived, and, perhaps most importantly, how expensive they were to the Crown.

This usage of a census was the first systematic attempt to gather information on indigenous peoples; however, this technique had been used previously in Britain. The period 18011831 marked the introduction of the population census in Britain [Lawton, 1978, p. 12]. Cullen [1975, p. 13] argued that the introduction of a population census was intended to provide rhetorical support for Britain’s military endeavors:

More accurate information would enable the government to form more effective policies, particularly with regard to the recruitment of the armed forces. The census . . . would show a substantial population increase, thus demonstrating the nation’s growing prosperity and allaying domestic discontent.

In the three decades following the introduction of a population census, this technique of government was a favored starting point for addressing issues of the day:

The many environmental, social and economic problems of the nineteenth century — health and disease, housing and sanitation, employment and unemployment, deprivation and poverty — gave rise to an abundance of Royal Commissions and Committees of Enquiry and local government investigations and committee reports. But, in these and related matters, the census of population must often be the starting point of investigation [Lawton, 1978, p. 21].
The census was applied to various populations within society — national crime statistics began to be published in 1810, education statistics in 1818, and the health of factory children in 1816 [Cullen, 1975, pp. 1316]. In this regard, the transference of this technique to indigenous peoples can be seen as an outgrowth of this trend within Britain itself.

The history of the population census within Britain implies that the notion of a census was a popular solution to “problems of government” at this juncture. Starting from its deployment as a technique to justify the viability of the military, the census came to be viewed as a prerequisite for other government action. In terms of indigenous peoples, this was also the case. The 1844 Royal Commission Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada contains the results of the 1837 census of indigenous peoples and frames the recommendations in light of the census results. This [ac]counting of indigenous peoples, we propose, can be read as an attempt to produce a map of the indigenous population, to generate a certain type of knowledge which allowed Britain to govern indigenous peoples effectively [Said, 1979, p. 36]. Although this form of accounting differs from the type of accounts generated by commercial enterprises, the function is similar to gather and represent information at a pointintime in order to exercise control (whether we refer to this control as governmentality or stewardship). Interestingly, the usage of techniques of census on indigenous peoples presupposes a subject population and assumes a paternal relationship whereby the colonial government has the right to attempt to govern indigenous peoples. As mentioned previously, this repre

sents a change from the nationtonation relationship enunciated in the 1763 Royal Proclamation.
While the transfer of the [ac]counting techniques of census to indigenous peoples can be traced to techniques of government used in Britain at this juncture, we are unsure whether the suggestion by Lord Glenelg to use funding relations as a technology of government was a transfer of an existing technique or a “made in the colonies” solution. Issues of lineage aside, following Lord Glenelg’s letter to the governors in 1835, accounting techniques of governance were applied to the indigenous population.

The areas of agriculture and education were the initial sites in which the Crown attempted to change behavior via the manipulation of presents. For example, in an 1836 letter to the governors of the Canadian provinces, Lord Glenelg [1836, p. 433] recommended shifting a portion of the funds spent on presents to the area of education:

[His Majesty’s Government] are prepared, should you think such a measure practicable, and if the consent of the Indians can be obtained to it, to sanction the application of at least a portion of the sums now expended in the purchase of stores and presents, to the erection of school houses, the purchase of elementary books, and the payment of resident schoolmasters, for the benefit of Indian tribes.

Likewise in a subsequent letter, Lord Glenelg suggested that with the view of encouraging indigenous peoples to abandon a wandering lifestyle that agricultural implements be substituted for other presents “giving [indigenous peoples] agricultural implements, but no other Description of Presents” [Glenelg, 1838, p. 235]. The policy direction provided by Glenelg was consistent with the interests of settlers that indigenous peoples be “encouraged” to abandon traditional pursuits which conflicted with settlement.

These policies regarding the manipulation of presents were reiterated and reaffirmed in the 1844 Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada. This Report recommended major changes to the Indian Department and an increased emphasis on agriculture and education, with the manipulation of presents being the primary method of encouraging these changes. Subsequent to this Report, the annual issue of gunpowder was withheld:

On the 30th of January, 1849, the Earl of Elgin reported the arrangement made by Lord Metcalf in 1845, with most of the settled Tribes, where by the annual issue of gunpowder was withheld on the understanding that the sum saved would be applied to promoting education among them [Report of the Special Commissioners, 1858, p. 2].

Such manipulations continued until 1858 when the British Parliament recommended that the annual issue of presents be discontinued. These examples strongly suggest that presents distributed to indigenous peoples were used as a specific technology of government in an attempt to encourage certain types of behavior, notably the pursuit of a “settled” and “civilized” lifestyle. Interestingly, Foucault’s discussion of governmentality seems to envision this very type of manipulation in that he states that it is often “customs” (i.e., a wandering lifestyle) that techniques of government are directed at changing. “The things with which government is to be concerned with are in fact men, but men in their relation to that other kind of thing, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking” [Foucault, 1991, p. 93]. It was through the usage of accounting techniques of governance that Britain attempted to satisfy the competing demands for the minimization of costs, the civilization and protection of indigenous peoples, and their control and containment on segregated reserves.

Although the preceding analysis has focused on the use of accounting techniques to accomplish governmentality, other techniques of government were also deployed. For example, the appointment of Indian agents responsible for the affairs of specific tribes was used to implement government policy, helping to accomplish the goals of containment and civilization [Milloy, 1983, pp. 5960]. Likewise the establishment of the first residential schools during the 1840s, with their explicit objectives of “weaning [indigenous peoples] from the habits and feelings of their ancestors…” [Grant, 1996, p. 59] and the increasing involvement of missionaries in the administration of the affairs of indigenous peoples [cf. York and Pindera, 1992, pp. 8889], complemented the aforementioned accounting techniques in achieving governmentality. Consistent with Miller and Rose’s [1990, p. 97] observation that governmentality is accomplished via heterogenous technologies operating in heterogenous sites, governmentality was accomplished in the case of indigenous peoples by a variety of mechanisms, including accounting, operating in different locales.

CONCLUSION

Explanations of the success of British imperialism during the 1800s often emphasize the importance of technology [cf. Headrick, 1981, 1988], political values [cf. Lloyd, 1996] or economic motivations [cf. Hobson, 1902]. The current study supplements these explanations by documenting the role(s) played by accounting techniques within the military machinery of empire. Our thesis is that accounting techniques, at least in the early 1800s, were firmly embedded within the military machinery of empire and served to frame the military decisions of the day. Drawing upon the theoretical work of Foucault [1991], Miller and Rose [1990, 1995], Said [1979, 1993], and others, we theorize accounting as a technology of government that helped to facilitate action at a distance. More specifically, we propose that accounting contributed to British imperialism by returning to the centers of calculation information that rendered distant territories and their occupants governable.

In the context of Canada’s indigenous peoples, the current study sought to analyze the moment(s) at which indigenous peoples came to be viewed as a governable population rather than as a distinct nation and when/how accounting techniques came to penetrate this domain. Our analysis suggested that the competing pressures of financial rationalization in the Canadas, the demands from settlers that indigenous peoples be contained, and reformist discourses emphasizing the importance of civilizing indigenous peoples encouraged the identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population. In response to these pressures, Lord Glenelg proposed the manipulation of funding relations (i.e., the annual distribution of presents) as a method of accomplishing these disparate objectives. This public statement by the Secretary of the Colonies simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a governable population and proposed the technology of government that would encourage the desired behavior. Subsequent to this pronouncement, the [ac]counting techniques of census were transferred from the imperial center in the attempt to come to “know” indigenous peoples, and funding relations were systematically manipulated in the attempt to satisfy the competing policy objectives. Thus, as a consequence of this chain of events, we see in the 18301858 period the slippage from a nationtonation relationship between Britain and indigenous peoples to a paternal relationship. Intertwined with this slippage was the identification/construction of indigenous peoples as a governable population, and the penetration of this domain by accounting (and other techniques) functioning as technologies of government.

The study resonates with the current day in that it makes visible the lineage of paternal views regarding indigenous peoples and the persistence of accounting technologies of governance within this domain. However, while the current study is suggestive of parallels between the 1830s and the 1990s, more research is needed to understand how accounting techniques of governance have changed/evolved over this time period. Foucault [1991] and Said [1979], for example, implied that techniques of regulation/government may become more precise over time as the knowledge gained from previous attempts helps to refine the technologies. Yet Miller and Rose [1990, p. 10] provided the caution that “whilst ‘governmentality’ is eternally optimistic, ‘government’ is a congenitally failing operation.” Consequently, more research is needed to understand how the accounting technologies of government directed at indigenous peoples have changed since the 1830s, whether these technologies have become more precise in terms of the effects they are intended to induce, and the manner in which these technologies are resisted by those targeted by them.

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