Reviewed by Orace Johnson University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign

The author should have addressed practicing accountants and auditors explicitly, as well as teachers of history, when, near the end of this tract on the logic of historical thought, he wrote:

“Each day, every rational being on this planet asks ques-tions about things that actually happened-questions which directly involve the logic of inquiry, explanation, and argument which is discussed in this book. . . . This common everyday form of historical thought consists of specific inquiries into small events, for particular present and future purposes [emphasis added] to which all the academic monographs in the world are utterly irrelevant.” (p. 316)

While “academic” as used here seems a bit pejorative, and “utterly’’ is surely an exaggeration, in the popular connotation of the term this book is relevant to everyone in the accounting profession —whether teacher researcher, or practitioner — who makes

(1) specific inquiries, into
(2) small events, for
(3) particular purposes.

The author’s stated purpose was “not to compile a catalogue of all fallacies which historians might commit, but rather to collect a few common fallacies which actually occur in historical thinking, and to extract a few rules of reason from this experience.” (We could surely use such a compilation from accounting literature!) “The thesis of this book is that historians, and all men who seek to think historically, tend to make certain assumptions in their work, and that these assumptions have logical consequences which must be respected.

. . Logic is not everything. But is is something— something which can be taught, something which can be learned, something which can help us in some degree to think more sensibly about the dangerous world in which we live.” (p. 306) In my judgment, the author has succeeded exceptionally well. The contents of this book are divided into three parts as follows:

(1) Inquiry, including three chapters on fallacies of question-fram ing, factual verification, and factual significance;

(2) Explanation, including six chapters on fallacies of generalization, narration, causation, motivation, composition, and false analogy;

(3) Argument, including two chapters on fallacies of semantical distortion and substantive distortion.

Each of the 113 different kinds of actual fallacies discussed in the 11 chapters is richly illustrated with examples which are carefully analyzed to establish the precise nature of the fallacy. (Not enough examples, however, are taken from accounting and related business fields where they surely exist in abundance.) Then each chapter concludes with positive principles, affirmative axioms, criteria, and occasionally pious platitudes—in total, 83 “rules of thumb . . . that good historians feel in their bones and apply without thinking. If such rules are raised to the level of consciousness, practices might hopefully improve.” (p. 63)

The concluding section of this tract emphasizes that a study of history can be useful to

(1) clarify the contexts of contemporary problems,
(2) establish trends, directions and prospects,
(3) refine knowledge of theory,
(4) help us to find out who we are, and
(5) teach us how to think historically. These uses are improved where logical fallacies are reduced.

For example:

In Chapter 2 on fallacies of factual verification, one of the eleven kinds discussed is the fallacy of pseudo proof. The author writes this paragraph:
In a book entitled Cities in Revolt (New York, 1955) Bridenbaugh argued that Bostonians were heavily taxed in the period 1743-1760. His evidence consisted in an exclamatory assertion that “at the close of this period the levy on the ‘Estates Real and Personal’ of Bostonians amounted to 13s.6d. in the pound, or 67 percent!” But this statement, in itself, tells the reader nothing. Were those thirteen shillings and sixpence extracted from a pound of property at market value or from an assessed valuation of estates? Bridenbaugh doesn’t tell us. Let us assume the latter, which was probably the case.

If so, what were the assessment rates in proportion to real value—100 percent? 50 percent? 5 percent? If rates were high the Bostonians were very heavily taxed, in whatever year Bridenbaugh found his figure. But if they were low, then the Boston tax rate might have been absurdly small. Bridenbaugh’s “fact” helps us not at all to clarify the con-fusion. As it is presented to the reader, it has no more evidential value than the exclamation point which ends his sentence.” (pp. 43-44)

The most important result from a careful study of this book will be an improvement in actual thinking about

(1) specific inquiries into
(2) small events for
(3) particular purposes.

What could be more practically relevant than that?