Gadis J. Dillon
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

CORPORATE ASSET REVALUATIONS: 1925-1934

Abstract: Early SEC filings for 110 corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange are used to summarize the extent and accounting treatment of asset revaluations during the period 1925-1934. The findings, considered with a brief review of the relevant contemporary accounting literature, lead to the conclusion that the popular conception of extensive and misleading revaluations is generally unsupported. Significantly, no firm in the sample increased reported earnings during the period 1925-1929 as a result of asset revaluations.

Asset valuation procedures and their impact on reported earnings have long been major issues in the accounting literature and in ac-counting practice. Corporate asset revaluations during the period immediately preceding the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930’s have special importance, since a popular conception exists that these economic tragedies were in part the result of inadequate, misleading or even fraudulent account-ing practices.

This study, which is an extension of prior research done by Fabri-cant,2 summarizes the asset revaluation practices of a sample of large corporations during the period 1925-1934, with special attention to the period 1925-1929. Although the popular conception of improper asset revaluation practices contributed to significant and far-reaching political responses in the Thirties and is still widely accepted today, the findings here are not consistent with that popular concept ion.

The first section of this paper briefly reviews the contemporary accounting literature to provide a perspective for evaluating the ac-counting practices of the late Twenties and early Thirties. The balance of the paper summarizes the actual asset revaluation practices of a sample of 110 large corporations, investigating the impact on both the balance sheet and the income statement.

The Accounting Literature

A large increase in the price level occurred during and immediately after World War I. Prices leveled out somewhat during the twenties, but at about double the pre-war level. Many proponents of comprehensive asset revaluation argued that financial statements based solely on historical cost therefore did not represent economic reality. Outstanding accounting theorists such as Paton,3 Hatf ield4 and Dickinson5 advocated comprehensive asset revaluations.

A related argument, expressed by many, was that depreciation based on historical cost did not reflect the true cost of using the fixed assets and did not adequately provide for replacement when existing assets were retired. Sweeney6 suggested this was the motive of most accountants who advocated asset revaluations.

These arguments in the literature apparently had some impact on accounting practitioners. Moss7 and Bennett8 indicated that asset revaluations were generally acceptable in practice. The editor of the Journal of Accountancy, A. P. Richardson,9 advocated revalua-tions in an editorial. Several Special Bulletins10 issued by the American Institute of Accountants’ Library and Bureau of Information were written as though asset revaluations were readily accepted in practice. There were some opponents, such as Couchman,11 but a large majority of the accounting literature supported asset revaluations.

While the concept of asset revaluation was acceptable, the tech-niques for implementation were less well-defined. Many advocated using independent professional appraisal firms and similar methods, independent of management determinations.

It has been charged, however, that some accountants were willing to accept and certify arbitrary and possibly misleading valuations established by boards of directors without independent assistance.

Asset revaluations take on added significance if they have a direct impact on reported earnings. While most authors preferred recognizing revaluations, practically no one advocated reflecting such write-ups in the reported earnings. Most, like Hatfield14 and Canning,15 suggested that the appraisal increase be taken to an “appreciation surplus” account, which would appear as a separate account in the stockholders’ equity section of the balance sheet. A Special Bulletin16 also indicated that revaluations should not be taken into earnings.
Given the support for asset revaluations in the accounting literature, it is not surprising that they occurred. Of perhaps more importance is the extent and the accounting treatment of asset revaluations in the twenties and thirties.

Dillon: Corporate Asset Revaluations: 1925-1934 3
SEC Form 10

The remainder of this paper summarizes actual asset revaluation practices. If this summary were constructed from the individual cor-porate annual reports or the financial reporting services of the twenties and thirties, questions could be raised as to the validity and the robustness of the data. Fortunately, a more reliable and complete source of data is available.

The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required all corporations whose securities were listed on any stock exchange to file an approved registration application with the Securities and Exchange Commission before July 1, 1935. Most firms filed using Form 10. This form could be prepared by the registrant, but it had to be certified by an independent accountant (usually a certified public accountant) before being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The original Form 10’s are stored in the archives of The Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C.

Form 10 primarily required financial and other information for the two most recent fiscal years ending before July 1, 1935. It did, however, include one question, Question 34, about past asset revaluations. Specifically, each corporation was asked:

If, since January 1, 1925, there have been any increases or decreases in investments, in property, plant and equipment, or in intangible assets, resulting from substantially revaluing such assets, state:

(i) In what year or years such revaluations were made, (ii) The amounts of such write-ups or write-downs, and the accounts affected, including the contra entry or entries, (iii) If in connection with such revaluations any adjustments were made in related reserve accounts, state the accounts and amount, with explanations.

Prior Research

Fabricant18 in 1936 summarized the Form 10 responses of 208 large industrial firms (primarily mining and manufacturing firms) chosen randomly from those listed on the New York Stock Exchange. He found that 75 per cent reported write-ups or write-downs

*While gathering data from the SEC archives, I learned that many of the older documents filed there may be destroyed due to lack of storage space. This would be unfortunate, since these documents represent an excellent primary source for accounting and business historians. During the period 1925-1934. He also reported aggregate write-ups and write-downs.as a per cent of the 1934 aggregate book value of assets. Using his data, an average write-up of 5.7 per cent and an average write-down of 14.8 per cent of 1934 book values may be calculated for all firms which reported write-ups or write-downs. Fabricant also reported the number of revaluations in each year 1925-1934 and the dollar amount each year, although his data did not correct for double counting of firms which revalued two or more times. He finally discussed the likely motives of management in recording the revaluations.

Fabricant made a significant contribution to understanding the extent of asset revaluations, but his work has several limitations. Perhaps most important from the accountant’s view is the failure to address the accounting treatment of the revaluations. That is, there is no discussion of the off-setting debit or credit entry when a revaluation was recorded. Also, Fabricant assessed the relative magnitude of write-ups and write-downs by comparing the revaluation amount to 1934 book values. “The dollar magnitude of write-downs as a percentage of net book value is therefore seriously overstated.”19 Write-up percentages may be overstated or understated, depending on whether there was a subsequent write-down.

Fabricant calculated a weighted average of write-ups and writedowns to 1934 net book value, taking the total amount of write-ups and write-downs for all firms and dividing by the total 1934 net book value of assets for all firms. This is consistent with his interest in macro-economic implications. However, to assess the importance of write-ups and write-downs for individual firms, it seems more relevant to calculate a simple average of each firm’s per cent write-up or write-down. Finally, much of Fabricant’s work is temporally aggregated. Since the period investigated breaks down into two rather distinct sub-periods (1925-1929 prior to the Stock Market Crash and 1930-1934 after the crash), it seems desirable to investigate the incidence and relative magnitude of write-ups and writedowns for each year and for each sub-period.

The Sample

A sample of 110 firms was randomly selected from the population of all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange in October, 1929. Since the New York Stock Exchange accounted for over 60 per cent of all shares traded and well over two-thirds of the total stock market dollar volume in the United States during the late 1920’s,20 it seems appropriate to select the sample from that population. The sample represents nearly 10 per cent of all firms listed then on the New York Stock Exchange. The Form 10 for each sample firm was reviewed to obtain information about its asset revaluations.

The Findings

The information gathered is summarized in Tables I-IV. Table I shows the total dollar amount of revaluations and the number of sample firms which revalued assets either upwards or downwards during the years 1925-1934 for each class of assets and for all assets identified on Form 10. It is interesting to note that upward revaluations of intangibles were quite uncommon in the period 1925-1934. The $8.75 million increase in 1927 and the $2.1 million increase in 1928 were revaluations by Standard Oil of New Jersey. Both were attributed to the increase in valuation of patents owned. Together, these increases represented less than one per cent of Standard Oil of New Jersey’s total assets.

Upward revaluations of investments were also rather rare. Most of the dollar amount of revaluations of investments ($27.7 million in 1926 and $14.3 million in 1929, or 73 per cent of all upward revaluations of investments by sample firms) were by General Motors. The 1926 adjustment was to write up General Motors’ investment in Fisher Body Corporation to the book value per Fisher Body’s books, prior to consolidating Fisher Body Corporation. The 1929 write-up was to convert the investment in General Motors Acceptance Corporation (an unconsolidated subsidiary) from the cost to the equity basis.

During the late 1920’s, total downward revaluations exceeded total upward revaluations. Only in the years 1926 and 1927 were there more upward than downward revaluations. In total dollar amount, almost one-half of all upward revaluations were attributable to the General Motors revaluations ($42 million or 20 per cent of the total) and to a 1927 revaluation by Pullman, Incorporated ($56.5 million or 27 per cent of the total). The Pullman revaluation was a recognition of increased market values at the time of a reorganization. Almost half the downward revaluations ($162 million or 49 per cent) were the result of write-downs in 1927, 1928, and 1929 by United States Steel. The General Motors write-ups aggregated about 4 per cent of General Motors’ total assets; the Pullman write-ups were about 19 per cent of Pullman’s total assets; and the U.S. Steel write-downs were about 7 per cent of U.S. Steel’s total assets.

Assei ($ TABLE I : Revaluations Thousands)
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1925-1 929 1930-1934
PLANT ASSETS Amount of Increase Number Firms-Increase Amount of Decrease Number Firms-Decrease 13,625 4 (5,760) 3 35,332 7 (10,047) 4 75,673 8 (55,041) 6 11,282 5 (64,496) 8 6,785 7 (91,595) 6 142,697 21 (226,939) 20 37,774 14 (374,045) 47
INVESTMENTS Amount of Increase Number Firms-Increase Amount of Decrease Number Firms-Decrease 2,526 1 (412) 32,592 2 (100) 7,718 3 (100) 0
(2,598) 3 14,344 1 (8,410) 4 57,180 6 (11,620) 5 6,883 70 (119,289)
29
INTANGIBLES Amount of Increase
Number Firms-Increase Amount of Decrease Number Firms-Decrease 7
1 (16,407) 4 0
(12,654) 5 8,750 1 (9,545) 6 2,100 1 (42,972) 5 566 1 (14,372) 6 11,423 3 (95,950) 14 239 1 (95,871) 26
ALL REVALUATIONS Amount of Increase Number Firms-Increase Amount of Decrease Number Firms-Decrease 16,158 6 (22,579)
7 67,924 9 (22,801)
9 92,141 11 (64,686)
10 13,382 6 (110,066)
14 21,695 9 (114,377)
12 21 1,300 29 (334,509)
30 44,896 20 (589,205)
6

Dillon: Corporate Asset Revaluations: 1925-1934

In Table I the dollar amounts may be totaled horizontally or vertically as appropriate. However, since some firms revalued more than one type of asset in a given year it is not possible to total the number of firms across rows or down columns. Double counting is avoided by including a firm no more than once in any of the totals. In the case of a firm which revalued assets both upwards and downwards, the firm is included among the total for both types of revaluations. Eliminating this double counting, it was found that 46 firms (42 per cent of the sample) revalued assets upwards and/or downwards during the period 1925-1929 and 71 firms (65 per cent of the sample) revalued assets upwards and/or downwards during the pe-riod1 930-1934. During the entire period 1925-1934, 81 firms (74 per cent of the sample) reported revaluations. These latter findings are consistent with those of Fabricant, who reported that 75 per cent of the firms in his sample made an affirmative response to the asset revaluation question on Form 10.21

The dollar amounts are not as indicative of the magnitude of asset revaluations as are the ratios of revaluation amount to total assets of the firm immediately prior to the revaluation. Table II recasts the information contained in the “All Revaluations” section of Table I in terms of these percentages. In no year did more than 10 per cent of the firms in the sample revalue assets upwards, with about one quarter of the firms in the sample revaluing assets upwards at any time during the 1925-1929 period.

For each firm which reported any revaluation during the period 1925-1929, the book value of total assets before the revaluation was determined by adjusting amounts reported in the annual report for the year of the revaluation. If the annual report was unavailable, Moody’s Industrial Manual was used. The percentage relationships between revaluation amounts and total firm assets before revaluation are reported in Table II. The simple average of these percentages and the median percentage for each year are reported.

The average percentage write-up is rather high for 1925 and 1926, primarily because of large write-ups by two firms in 1925 and by one firm in 1926. In 1925, Walworth Company revalued assets upwards by 25 percent and Oppenheim Collins by 24 per cent. Both revaluations were the results of appraisals at the time of reorganization. In 1926, Tennessee Corporation revalued its investments upwards by 28 per cent of total assets, to increase an unconsolidated subsidiary from a nominal $1.00 valuation to an amount equal to its book value. These were the only write-ups found which exceeded 20 per cent of total assets before revaluation.

TABLE II
Relationship of Asset Revaluations
to Total Firm Assets
(1 925-1929)

UPWARD REVALUATIONS: 1925 1926 1927 1928
Mean Revaluation—as a
Percentage of Total Assets 11.4% 8.9% 4.9% 3.6%
Median Revaluation—as a
Percentage of Total Assets 4.3% 4.6% 2.1 % 0.7%
Percentage of Firms in the
Sample which Revalued in Year 5.5% 8.2% 10.0% 5.5%
DOWNWARD REVALUATIONS:
Mean Revaluation—as a
Percentage of Total Assets 10.5% 7.3% 3.6% 5.8%
Median Revaluation—as a
Percentage of Total Assets 6.6% 1.8% 0.9% 4.6%
Percentage of Firms in the
Sample which Revalued in Year 6.4% 8.2% 9.1% 12.7%

1929 1925-1929
2.7% 6.1%
1.2% 2.1%
8.2% 26.4%
6.0%
4.8%
3.9%
1.9%
27.3%
10.9%

Dillon: Corporate Asset Revaluations: 1925-1934 9

During the period 1925-1929, the write-ups which did occur averaged 6.1 per cent of total assets, and the average was that high because of a few relatively large write-ups. The median write-up was 2.1 per cent. Only 10 firms in the sample, less than 10 per cent of the total, revalued assets upwards by more than 5 per cent of the total assets. Five of those firms (American Brown Boveri, Oppen-heim Collins, Pullman, U.S. Distributing, and Walworth) did so to reflect appraisals, three resulting from reorganization; two firms (Bethlehem Steel and Cerro de Pasco Copper) wrote-up assets to conform to valuations used by the Treasury Department for tax purposes; two (American Brake Shoe and Continental Can) revalued goodwill downward and revalued other assets upwards; and one (Tennessee Corporation) wrote-up investments to reflect the book value of an unconsolidated subsidiary. Except for American Brown Boveri, which revalued assets upwards by more than 5 per cent in two dif-ferent years (15 per cent in 1926 and 14 per cent in 1928), no firm in the sample revalued assets upwards by so large a relative amount more than once.

The offsetting credits or debits which result from revaluing assets are an important part of the impact of revaluations. Tables III and IV, respectively, report the accounts credited when assets were revalued upwards and the accounts debited when assets were revalued downwards. The totals on Tables Ill and IV are the same as the “All Revaluations” section of Table I.

During the period 1925-1929 no firm in the sample increased in-come as a result of asset revaluations upwards. All revaluations upwards during the 1925-1929 period were confined to the balance sheet, with most of the credits being made to surplus. As seen on Table IV, a few downward revaluations reduced net income. The most significant was the $44.8 million write-down of plant assets in 1927 by U.S. Steel. No reason for this write-down was given in the Form 10, and it cannot be traced in U.S. Steel’s annual reports.

Most of the offsetting debits and credits upon revaluation of as-sets, both in number of firms and amount of revaluation, were made to an unspecified surplus account. It was quite common in this period for a firm to show a single (unspecified) surplus account on its balance sheet in the stockholders’ equity section. While the source of the surplus was not specified, direct debits or credits to that account for asset revaluations did not flow through the income statement.

TABLE III
Offsetting Credit Accounts
for Asset Revaluations Upwards
($ Thousands)

Credit Entry to: 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1925-1929 1930-1934
Earned Surplus (Number of Firms) 0 574 (1) 12,336 (3) 4,634 (2) 2,323 (2) 19,867 (5) 25,036 (3)
Capital Surplus (Number of Firms) 2,526 (1) 0 13,949 (3) 2,100 (1 ) 0 18,575 (4) 4,764 (2)
Appreciation Surplus (Number of Firms) 0 4,500 (1) 0 0 0 4,500 (1) 0
Unspecified Surplus (Number of Firms) 11,334 (3) 61,942 (6) 64,408 (4) 3,465 (2) 17,064 (3) 158,213 (14) 9,760 (10)
Reserves (Number of Firms) 93
(1) 908
(1) 0 0 0 1,001 (1) 285
(2)
Capital Stock (Number of Firms) 2,205 (1) 0 0 0 543
(1) 2,748 (2) 0
Other Assets (Number of Firms) 0 0 1,448 (1 ) 3,183 (1) 1,765 (3) 6,396 (5) 4,230 (3)
Income (Number of Firms) 0 0 0 0 0 0 821 (2)
Totals (Number of Firms) 16,158 (6) 67,924 (9) 92,141 (11) 13,382 (6) 21,695 (9) 211,300 (29) 44,896 (20)

TABLE IV
Offsetting Debit Accounts
for Asset Revaluations Downwards
($ Thousands)

Debit Entry to: 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1925-1929 1930-1934
Earned Surplus (Number of Firms) 6,095 (2) 12,000 (4) 7,658 (4) 6,379 (3) 8,451 (2) 40,583 (6) 101,119 (18)
Capital Surplus (Number of Firms) 0 4,966 (1) 0 0 3,050 (2) 8,016 (3) 171,747 (20)
Appreciation Surplus (Number of Firms) 0 0 0 17,458 (1) 0 17,458 (1) 2,338 (1)
Unspecified Surplus (Number of Firms) 5,236 (2) 735 (3) 7,454 (5) 81,953 (11) 96,721 (6) 192,099 (18) 262,211 (41)
Reserves (Number of Firms) 524
(1) 0 21
(1 ) 993 (2) 79 (1) 1,617 (4) 11,432 (9)
Capital Stock (Number of Firms) 9,612 (2) 5,000 (1) 3,200 (1) 0 4,308 (1) 22,120 (4) 19,418 (3)
Other Assets (Number of Firms) 0 0 1,448 (1) 3,183 (1) 1,765 (3) 6,396 (5) 4,230 (2)
Income (Number of Firms) 1,112 (2) 100
(1) 44,905 (2) 100 (1 ) 3
(1) 46,220 (3) 16,710 (10)
Totals (Number of Firms) 22,579 (7) 22,801 (9) 64,686 (10) 110,066 (14) 114,377 (12) 334,509 (30) 589,205 (66)

12 The Accounting Historians Journal, Spring, 1979

Conclusions

Many present-day negative attitudes toward asset revaluation may be attributed in part to emotional and political responses during and after the Depression years to supposed asset revaluation abuses in the twenties and early thirties. Those abuses are a popular theme of advocates of historical cost asset valuations. During the Depression years the popular press, segments of the financial press, and politicians expounding their political rhetoric argued that frequent asset revaluations, often intended to deceive, had taken place. It is impossible to determine the motivation of management in recording asset revaluation. However, the explanations recorded on the Form 10’s seem reasonable and the information summarized here about the incidence, the relative magnitude, and the accounting treatment of revaluations does not reflect a pattern of extensive and deceptive revaluations.

Corporate asset revaluation practices in the period 1925-1 934, which were generally consistent with the contemporary accounting literature, were not so common nor extensive as is generally believed. Of the 110 large corporations surveyed, about one-fourth revalued any assets upwards before the stock market crash. in fact, more firms revalued assets downwards during the period 1925-1929 than revalued assets upwards. (Extensive upwards revaluations might have occurred during the rapid inflation of 1914-1920, or any other time prior to 1925. Unfortunately that information was not collected by the SEC.)

The total dollar amount of downward revaluations was more than one and one-half times the total dollar amount of upward revaluations. Large revaluations, relative to total assets, were rare. Less than ten per cent of the firms in the sample revalued assets upwards by as much as five per cent of total assets prior to the revaluation. There may be some exceptions, but the evidence tends to refute any belief that upward revaluations were generally frequent and frivolous in the pre-Depression era.

Most significantly, not one firm in the sample increased earnings during the period 1925-1929 as a result of asset revaluations. During 1925-1929, over 95 per cent of the dollar amount of upward revaluations was credited to a balance sheet surplus account. During the same period a few downward revaluations reduced earnings, although three quarters of the downward revaluations were debited to a balance sheet surplus. Given the evidence, it seems that corporations were not using asset revaluations as a device for directly manipulating earnings in this period.

Dillon: Corporate Asset Revaluations: 1925-1934 13

This study has not addressed several important issues. One is management’s motivation for recording asset revaluations. Another is the future impact, through depreciation policies, of asset revaluations. If firms did not credit or debit earnings as a result of asset revaluations and then did recognize depreciation expense based on the revised asset value, the rather interesting result is that downward revaluations tended to increase a firm’s earnings through time and upward revaluations tended to reduce earnings through time. Unfortunately, the depreciation policies of firms in the twenties and thirties are not easily determined.

Much remains to be discovered about the impact of asset valuation practices a half century ago. This study has hopefully provided some new evidence about just what those practices were.

FOOTNOTES

1The existence of a popular conception of extensive and misleading asset re-valuations is reflected in the following passages:
“Visions are called forth of the era between 1918 and 1934, when corporations frequently wrote up or wrote down the value of fixed assets by some arbitrary amount and altered depreciation changes accordingly. Often the revaluation made then seemed to have more to do with influencing the value of the com-pany’s securities on the stock exchange or with controlling dividend payments than with efforts to take account of changing prices in order to obtain a meaningful statement of profit.”
Edwards and Bell, The Theory and Measurement of Business Income, p. 185. “The belief that loose accounting practices had contributed to the 1929 market crash and the depression led to the first effective agitation for compulsory audit requirements.”

Chatfield, A History of Accounting Thought, p. 132.

“These investors (in the 1920’s) were unprotected from fraud or the consequences of their own ignorance. In particular, they could not rely on audited financial statements for their information.” Most, Accounting Theory, p. 65.
2Fabricant, “Revaluation of Fixed Assets.”
3Paton, Accounting Theory, p. 317.
4Hatfield, Accounting: Its Principles and Problems, p. 74.
5Dickinson, Accounting Practice and Procedure, p. 81.
6Sweeney, Stabilized-Accounting, p. 46.
7Moss, “Treatment of Appreciation of Fixed Assets,” p. 161.
8Bennett, “Treatment of Appreciation,” p. 427.
9Richardson, “Editorial,” Journal of Accountancy, p. 45.
10Special Bulletins of The American Institute of Accountants, September, 1921, and January, 1928.
11Couchman, “Limitations of the Present Balance Sheet,” p. 268.
12Examples include: Bennett, “Treatment of Appreciation,” pp. 428-429.

14 The Accounting Historians Journal, Spring, 1979
Moss, “Treatment of Appreciation of Fixed Assets,” p. 162. Kohler and Morrison, Principles of Accounting, pp. 233-234.
13May, Financial Accounting: A Distillation of Experience, p. 93.
14Hatfield, Accounting: Its Principles and Problems, pp. 78-79.
15Canning, The Economics of Accountancy, p. 77.
16 Special Bulletin of the American Institute of Accountants, January, 1928.
17Copied from original Form 10’s on file at the Securities and Exchange Com-mission, Washington, D.C.
18Fabricant, “Revaluations of Fixed Assets.”
19Zeff, Asset Appreciation, Business Income and Price Level Accounting: 1918-1935, p. 49.
20U.S., Congress, Senate, Stock Exchange Practices, pp. 8-9.
21Fabricant, “Revaluation of Fixed Assets,” p. 2.
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American Institute of Accountants, Special Bulletin of the American Institute of Accountants. Issued irregularly 1920-1929. Reproduced in Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards – Source Documents. New York: AICPA Research Division, 1963.
Bennett, George E. “Treatment of Appreciation.” Journal of Accountancy. XLV, No. 6. (June, 1928).
Canning, John B. The Economics of Accountancy. New York: The Ronald Press, 1929.
Chatfield, Michael. A History of Accounting Thought. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1974.
Couchman, Charles B. “Limitations of the Present Balance Sheet.” Journal of Accountancy. XLVI, No. 4. (October, 1928).
Dickinson, Arthur Lowes. Accounting Practice and Procedure. Lawrence, Kansas: Scholars Book Club, 1913 reprinted 1975.
Edwards, Edgar 0. and Bell, Philip W. The Theory and Measurement of Business Income. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1961.
Fabricant, Solomon, “Revaluation of Fixed Assets, 1925-1934,” National Bureau of Economic Research Bulletin No. 62, December 7, 1936, pp. 1-11. Reprinted in Zeff, ed., Asset Appreciation, Business Income and Price Level Accounting: 1918-1935.
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Richardson, A. P. “Editorial.” Journal of Accountancy. XLVIII, No. 1. (July, 1929).

Dillon: Corporate Asset Revaluations: 1925 – 1934 15
Sweeney, Henry. Stabilized Accounting. New York: Harper and Bros., 1936.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Banking and Currency Committee, Stock Exchange Prac-tices. Senate 73: 1-2, 1933.
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