POINT/COUNTERPOINT
edited by Thomas N. Tyson

Readers are invited to submit materials for this feature to Professor Tyson, St. John Fisher College, Rochester, NY 14618. Typically, this column will contain commentaries on or critiques of pieces of accounting history literature that have appeared in AHJ or elsewhere.

Terry K. Sheldahl SAINT LEO COLLEGE SAVANNAH CENTER)

DESCRIPTION, OBJECTIVITY, AND A ROBUST PLURALISM: A REPLY TO FLEISCHMAN AND TYSON

If more than welcome in intent, Fleischman and Tyson’s article “Archival Researchers: An Endangered Species?” [1997] prompted for me another question, “With friends like this, . . . ?.” It is a sad commentary on our field if their contribu-tions are so apt to be “minimalized” that it may “embarras[s]” mainly descriptive accounting historians [Fleischman and Tyson (F&T), 1997, pp. 102, 102 fn.] to be so cited. It is probably not coincidental that other accounting scholars are likely to deem historical study more intellectua/ the more it is “interpretive” in a mode intellectuals. In any case, as an unembarrassed predominantly descriptive author I challenge the assumptions made that we as a class have “a [less] theoretical bent” than other historians and (by declared relativists) are prone to overstating the “objectivity]” of our work [F&T, 1997, pp. 97, 102 (quoted)]. Follow-up conciliatory remarks [F&T, 1997, pp. 103-105] do not offset a gratuitous depreciation that has more broadly infected express Accounting Historians Journal (AHJ) editorial policy.

Concerning objectivity, I personally have long known of possible “selection” [F&T, 1997, pp. 97, 99, 102] and other bi-ases or pitfalls conventionally cited [Barzun and Graff, 1957, pp. 159-166 (principally); Dray, 1964, pp. 21-22]. In a 1989 philosophical lecture, I reviewed individually my publications,
Acknowledgments: Prepared in respectful memory of historian Henry Borzo, who introduced me to historiography and historical method in a 1961 course using Barzun and Graff’s [1957] text, and philosopher of history Maurice Mandelbaum, whom I as a student knew still better as an historian of philosophy. I thank the subject authors for inviting this critique.

presentations, and current projects in accounting history as of that time for problematic factors regarding objectivity, usually citing from four to eight points varying materially from one case to the next, and my efforts to surmount or contain them. For my companion books [Sheldahl, 1982, 1986] covering the accounting fraternity Beta Alpha Psi over 65 years, for example, I listed [Sheldahl, 1989, p. 2] mostly joint concerns regarding eight factors:

a. Periodization
b. Independence from sponsor, especially in covering scandal
c. Interviewing design and reliability
d. Limitations of minutes and other official sources
e. Random availability of files
f. Displacement of postal by telephone communication
g. Perspective on recent events
h. Pragmatic aspects.

Such a piecemeal approach seems sounder than a bald as-sertion of “[t]he impossibility of historical objectivity” (or of any contrary position) based on proof texting that excludes any sources of counter-arguments [F&T, 1997, pp. 97 (quoted), 98-99]. This particular question-begging appeal to authority uncritically cites for example, principally [F&T, 1997, p. 97] from Rieoeur, the contention that historical selection is “value guided” as such [Dray, 1964, pp. 23, 24 (quoted), 27-29]. Dray has argued [1964, pp. 24 (quoted), 29-35] that this “ancient argument” has “often been [too] quickly dismissed,” only to suggest [pp. 39-40], anticipating Haskell [1990], that it attacks a straw-person concept of objectivity.
Fleischman and Tyson’s wholly one-sided treatment reflects none of the complexity of an issue discussed by Passmore [1958] in terms of eight alternative criteria1 for objectivity. That

‘As possible sources or bases for “objective” inquiry, Passmore [1958] critically discussed (1) a “mathematical-deductive” structure [pp. 98 (quoted), 99], (2) observational data [pp. 99-100], (3) such data exclusive of “testimony” [pp. 100 (emphasis deleted), 101-102], (4) expressibility in language inviting substantially uniform interpretation [p. 102], (5) logically independent “atomic facts” [pp. 102 (emphasis deleted), 103], (6) non-arbitrary selectivity [pp. 103-105], (7) more than ad hoc testability or confirmability [pp. 106-107], and (8) conduciveness to general consensus [pp. 108-111]. Passmore [1958, p. 109] concluded in particular that if the test … is that there are regular ways of settling issues, by the use of which [persons] of whatever party can be brought to see what actually happened, then . . . one can[not reasonably] doubt the objectivity of history.

nature is abundantly clear from historian Novick’s That Noble Dream [1988], a philosophically informed study of a century of objectivity discussion and debate among, most prominently, American historians, credited by a British philosopher of history [Walsh, 1965, p. 436] as having long preceded their trans-Atlantic colleagues in such a concern. Novick’s rhetoric, befitting [1988, pp. 259, 269] a primary title drawn from Charles Beard, is much more relativist Lhan I would myself favor. As is shown in detail, however, by a commentator with a pointed and perhaps insightful title [Haskell, 1990] of his own likewise [Books in History, [1998], p. 1] adopted for a book, it ultimately does not conceal a generally moderate outlook on his topic.

Fleischman and Tyson [1997, pp. 97-100, 100 fn.] are attracted to a putative form of “cognitive” relativism in discussing a “paradigmatic” historiography linked at least nominally to Kuhn’s [1964] philosophy of science [Audi, 1995, s.v. “paradigm,” “relativism;” Krausz and Meiland, 1982, pp. 11-146; Novick, 1988, pp. 526-535]. Their sample paradigms from Marx, Foucault, and Neoclassical economics [F&T, 1997, p. 91] tend to suggest reductionist, ideological, or scientistic thinking, the freedom from which is for me a major attraction of descriptive work. An historical paradigm must not become a ‘”blik” — a presupposition with which we view experience, spectacles through which all data will be viewed’ [Rolston, 1997, p. 11], subject only to ad hoc adjustment as needed to accommodate “refractory facts.”

Keenly sensitive to such a pitfall, and to negative associa-tions of the kind just offered for their examples, Fleischman and Tyson [1997, p. 100] distinguish between writing ‘”to”‘ (blik) and ‘”within”‘ (non-blik) a paradigm. It may often be a formidable task effectively (that is, clearly) to draw that distinction in practice, however, as more than casual or isolated reference to a range [F&T, 1997, p. 103] of independent factors risks intruding and/or casting doubt on the theory’s assumed explanatory import.

2R. M. Hare [1955; my thanks to Holmes Rolston, ITI for ihe reminder] coined the term “blik,” italicizing it throughout, in defending religious belief understood as nonfalsifiable. A co-discussant LFIew, 1955, pp. 107-108] replied that religious doctrine on Hare’s analysis could lend no rationale for religious practices, and a later critic [Blackstone, 1963, pp. 77-78] argued incisively that no distinction can be sustained between bliks good or sane, and bad or delusional.

I do not doubt, even so, that paradigmatic work in account-ing history may be insightful or instructive, or wish otherwise to disparage it. To the contrary, my ideal is a robust pluralism in the field, inviting the broadest range of subjects, methods, and styles in keeping with a respected colleague’s advice [Graves, 1998, emphasis retained] that we assess research primarily for “quality” and, surely assuming a rich diversity of more than idiosyncratic interests (existing or prospective) in our midst, “whether or not [it] is interesting.” The stated editorial policy of AHJ over the past ten years is in these terms regrettable.
As foreshadowed in a Notebook entry [Previts, 1986], AHJ in 1988 introduced [“Guidelines on Research,” 1988-1994] seven submission “guidelines” embodying in the main a loosely scientific model with an invitation [no. 3] to present-day applications (absent due caution against presentist bias [F&T, 1997, p. 93]). In particular, it was assumed [“Guidelines on Research,” 1988-1994, no. 1] that papers would primarily address a specifiable “issue [not just topic], problem, and/or hypothesis,” that is, a matter to be solved or resolved, the (re)solution to be stated [no. 6] in a “conclusion/interpretation.” Coverage of a period of time [no. 4] should include reference to an array of “environmental factors.

A distinctly problem-solving orientation, one pragmatic or purposive beyond simply addressing scholarly curiosity, is cer-tainly appropriate for an accounting historian, but why should it be (all but) required? Successor editors Flesher and Samson [1990, p. 1] only begged the question in defining “research” accordingly. Their belated defense of the guidelines [pp. 1-2, 3 (quoted)] similarly ignored such key qualitative variables as originality, difficulty, depth, and range of description while generalizing all too sweepingly that only relatively “new” fields of study lend themselves to noteworthy work of that kind. In addition, a “plodding piece of ‘research’ which is of no significance to the researcher or anybody else, undertaken simply because the idea of research has become fashionable” [Raphael, 1994, p. 36], may surely be as problem-structured as it is trivial.

This perspective relates only marginally, in any case, to my own broad experience as a bibliographer and organizational historian, and for that matter, for an area expressly [“Guidelines on Research,” 1988-1994, intro. par.] “encouraged,” to biographical work that I have underway. Even the hypothesis reflected in the title of my article [Sheldahl, 1985] on Thomas Sarjeant was secondary to direct coverage of the subject text, and I am unaware of hypothesis testing or problem solving within a subsequent paper [Sheldahl, 1994] intended significantly to expand bibliographic work in our field through a full century’s coverage ill-suited to environmental references. I, of course, routinely reason hypothetically in purposeful scholarly pursuit of facts and sources (discovery), but that is quite another matter.

The final original specification [“Guidelines on Research,” 1988-1994, no. 7] abruptly changed course, to allow that
[p]urely descriptive papers continue to be of impor-tance[,] but must be carefully and completely developed so that they are dealing with original materials as principal sources.

“Pur[e]” description was left to the reader’s prior comprehension, but would properly exclude “interpretation” of a non-intellectualist kind, as represented I think, outside any pragmatic context beyond everyday understanding, within my Beta Alpha Psi [Sheldahl, 1982, 1986] and American Accounting Association [Shedahl, 1992] studies. At any rate, this seemingly ad hoc concession was dropped in a 1994 revision [“Statement of Policy,” 1994-1998, emphasis added] most notable otherwise, and welcome, for so modestly introducing the seven current numbered planks as guidelines that “may . . . [be] helpful.

As illustrated by then editor Previts’ coauthored 1989 his-tory [Coffman et al., 1989] of the sponsoring body, actual con-tent of AHJ over the past ten years has been broader than the editorial guidelines would lead one to suppose. Still, continued advancement of a pragmatic or problem-solving “paradigm” can only divide accounting historians, and perhaps offend some of them; discourage submissions from able scholars working outside such a framework, and possibly even lead them to question such endeavor; and otherwise tempt authors to frame their coverage in ways that may be unsuited to their topics or to their own styles or talents. The very publication of guidelines not consistently reflected in print raises, itself, a legitimate question of their intended point.

One possible rationale for (and motivant of) a problem-solving model is its potential appeal to mainstream non-historical accounting scholars. With or without prominent critiques [Ingram, 1991, pp. 121-122, 124-126, from a noted contributor; Sheldahl, 1992, p. 135, citing several examples, one of them partly from Previts] of contemporary academic research itself, or its dominance, there is no logical reason to look toward it for guidance for our own work. Nor, relatedly, should reputed commonly restrictive policies [Fleischman, 1998] of accounting journals outside our field regarding historical material deter us from ourselves seeking maximal breadth. In building on a reported base [Graves, 1998] of “better and better” Academy of Accounting Historians meetings or sessions, attracting “all sorts of papers — all kinds of approaches,” we could set a worthy example for other contributors to accounting research.

Logical analysis of historical study is important, intrinsi-cally and (for possible guidance in conducting or assessing first-level work) instrumentally alike. I would urge in closing that we stress constructive analysis in place of judgmental sub-ject-matter polemics of the kind that has gravely damaged [Allen, 1998] notable philosophy, literature, and, possibly [Alland, 1998, p. 7, in rebuttal], anthropology departments. In contributing to “a detailed unpacking” of an elusive concept of historical interpretation [Levich, 1965, pp. 338-340, 341 (quoted)], for example, our focus should be on diversity and inclusion, not the reverse.

An overall inclusionary perspective would promise an en-riched research corpus potentially benefiting all accounting historians in the course of ending the marginalization (or worse) of contributors, so rightly condemned by Fleischman and Tyson [1997, pp. 101-105], based simply on their particular historical interests, aptitudes, and, yes, values. For my own beleaguered class, I wish for a day when if descriptive accounting historians are called “chroniclers” or [F&T, 1997, p. 103, opposing such a use] ‘”antiquarians'”4, it is with due respect to books 13 and 14

3Among others — possibly even including the general American historical profession. In his 1997 work The Degradation of American History, David Harlan is said to find therein [History: New and Selected Titles, 1998, p. 1], “in the disillusionment following the 1960s,” a dominant turn to “the methodology of the social sciences.” His commitment instead to a “redemptive potential” recalls a grand humanistic interpretive tradition to which I would relate Michael Mepham, whose 18th century interests [1988 a,b] materially overlapped my own.

4Flcischman and Tyson [1997, p. 103] stated that “the ‘antiquarian’ label conveys a greater pejorative connotation among North American historians . . . than in U.K. academic circles.” If so, then either Elton [1987, pp. 151, 152 (quoted), 153-154] is a striking British exception, or the Americans would discredit even beyond disowning narrow specialists in antiquarian bailiwicks such as “parish history, local archaeology, genealogy, [and] lawyer’s history of the law.” My plain intent in the final sentence is in any case far more rhetorical than argumentative.

of the Old Testament; a 275-year compilation begun during the reign of Alfred the Great [Savage, 1988]; and a learned society founded by Isaiah Thomas late in President Madison’s first term [American Antiquarian Society, 1987, pp. 17-19].

REFERENCES

Alland, A. (1998), “Lettefr] to the Editor,” Lingua Franca: The Review of Academic Life, Vol. 8 (May-June): 7, 62.
Allen, C. (1998), “As Bad as it Gets,” Lingua Franca, Vol. 8 (March): 52-59.
American Antiquarian Society (AAS) (1987), The Collections and Programs of the American Antiquarian Society: A 175th-Anniversary Guide (Worcester, MA: AAS).
Audi, R. (ed.) (1995), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. “paradigm,” “relativism” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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Blackstone, W. T. (1963), The Problem of Religious Knowledge: The Impact of Contemporary Philosophical Analysis on the Question of Religious Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
Books in History ([1998]), The Johns Hopkins University Press, publisher’s book catalog, referencing Haskell, T., Objectivity is not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (1997).
Coffman, E. N., Roberts, A. R., and Previts, G. J. (1989), “A History of the Academy of Accounting Historians, 1973-1988,” Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 16 (Dec): 156-206.
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Elton, G.R. (1987), The Practice of History (London: Fontana Press), reprint of 1969 Fontana Paperbacks edition.
Fleischman, R. K. (1998), personal communication.
Fleischman, R. K. and Tyson, T. N. (1997), “Archival Researchers: An Endangered Species?,” Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 (Dec): 91-109.
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